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Abstract 
Political polarization at the elite level is a major concern in many contempo-
rary democracies, which is argued to alienate large swaths of the electorate 
and prevent meaningful social change from occurring, yet little is known about 
how individuals respond to political candidates who deviate from the party line 
and express policy positions incongruent with their party affiliations. This ex-
periment examines the neural underpinnings of such evaluations using func-
tional MRI (fMRI). During fMRI, participants completed an experimental task 
where they evaluated policy positions attributed to hypothetical political can-
didates. Each block of trials focused on one candidate (Democrat or Republi-
can), but all participants saw two candidates from each party in a randomized 
order. On each trial, participants received information about whether the can-
didate supported or opposed a specific policy issue. These issue positions var-
ied in terms of congruence between issue position and candidate party affili-
ation. We modeled neural activity as a function of incongruence and whether 
participants were viewing ingroup or outgroup party candidates. Results sug-
gest that neural activity in brain regions previously implicated in both evalu-
ative processing and work on ideological differences (insula and anterior cin-
gulate cortex) differed as a function of the interaction between incongruence, 
candidate type (ingroup versus outgroup), and political ideology. More liberal 
participants showed greater activation to incongruent versus congruent trials 
in insula and ACC, primarily when viewing ingroup candidates. Implications 
for the study of democratic representation and linkages between citizens’ calls 
for social change and policy implementation are discussed. 
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I could never toe the party line. I’d wear out the carpet crossing the floor. 
– Hazel McCallion, former mayor of Mississauga, Ontario 
Introduction 
Representation is the crucial link between citizens’ calls for social change and 
actual policy change, and a key element of ensuring representation in any dem-
ocratic system is the ability of citizens to elect and monitor public officials 
who align with their views on major political issues so that policies can be im-
plemented that represent the diverse preferences of the public. However, po-
litical parties are often pressured to appeal to their base in such a way that 
elected officials are encouraged to constrain their policy positions and “toe the 
party line”—i.e., to follow the ideals and policy preferences of their political 
party (and its more extreme members) rather than their often more moder-
ate constituency. Political parties desire to distinguish themselves from other 
parties by highlighting these differences, which only increases the likelihood 
of gridlock (Binder, 2003; Haas, 2016; Mondak & Mitchell, 2008). In a two-
party system such as that of the USA, this can lead to unprecedented levels 
of political polarization and alienation of large swaths of the electorate (see, 
e.g., Masket, 2009; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; Sinclair, 2006; The-
riault, 2008). Polarization in political elites and a divided government slows 
down government productivity through political gridlock (Binder, 2003; Ed-
wards III, Barrett, & Peake, 1997), which in turn slows down social change. 
Thus, somewhat ironically, one of the major obstacles preventing meaningful 
social change in US politics is the inability of elected officials to compromise 
with political opponents from across the aisle. 
In this paper, we address the question of how citizens actually respond to 
an elected official who deviates from party-based expectations. In general, 
trust in government and public satisfaction with the degree of representation 
that exists in the USA are fairly low (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Pew Re-
search Center, 2015), and an increasingly popular viewpoint is that the USA 
should make it easier for third-party candidates or political “outsiders” to gain 
traction in government (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Jones, 2014). However, 
despite the public’s desire for increased representation, we do not fully under-
stand how people respond to politicians who deviate from the party line, which 
is a prerequisite for diminishing elite polarization and reducing the alienation 
it yields. How do individuals react when a politician voices opinions that are 
incongruent with his or her party affiliation? To what degree are incongruent 
policy positions scrutinized by members of the public? 
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine how 
neural activity in regions of the brain associated with evaluative process-
ing differs when a candidate states policy positions that are either congruent 
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or incongruent with what would normally be expected given the candidate’s 
party affiliation. Neural activity in regions implicated in social judgment and 
person perception has been shown to differ as a function of expectancy viola-
tions (e.g., Cloutier, Gabrieli, O’Young, & Ambady, 2011), and we sought to ex-
tend this work to regions of the brain implicated in attitudes and evaluative 
processing of information, including the amygdala, insula, and anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC; see, e.g., Cunningham, Haas, & Jahn, 2011; Cunningham & 
Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007). We examine 
the degree to which these brain regions were differentially activated for con-
gruent versus incongruent policy statements in order to gauge when individ-
uals were more likely to attend to deviations from party-based expectations. 
Importantly, we also test for asymmetries in how people respond to these 
deviations. First, it is possible that individuals respond differently to incongru-
ence from members of their own party than to incongruence from members of 
another party, as the attitudes literature suggests individuals are more likely 
to engage in cognitive elaboration when information is personally relevant 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and neuroscience work has suggested that neural 
processing in emotion-related regions (insula) and regions implicated in cog-
nitive control (anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) differ when 
viewing photographs of ingroup versus outgroup party elites (Kaplan, Freed-
man, & Iacoboni, 2007). Second, we test for the possibility that incongruence 
is processed differently between liberals and conservatives. A growing liter-
ature has examined psychological differences between individuals endorsing 
right- or left-of-center beliefs, and mounting evidence suggests liberals and 
conservatives differ in how they deal with ambiguity (Golec & Federico, 2004; 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), monitor internal conflict (Amo-
dio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Jost & Amodio, 2012), and manage cognitive 
dissonance (Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013). In line with this work, we inves-
tigate how neural responses to incongruent policy statements differ between 
liberals and conservatives. 
The results of this study reflect a first step in identifying the mechanisms 
underlying how individuals react to public officials deviating from expecta-
tions. Calls for increased representation and laments about polarization and 
the alienation of average citizens are commonplace throughout contemporary 
democracies, yet we do not have a detailed understanding of the social cogni-
tive and neural processes underlying how individuals process and respond to 
candidates who deviate from party stereotypes. Further, identifying asymme-
tries in how individuals respond to incongruent policy positions is essential 
because if people respond to incongruence in ingroup candidates differently 
than outgroup candidates, or if people from opposite ends of the ideologi-
cal spectrum process incongruence differently, it suggests the electorate may 
make deviating from the party line easier for some candidates than for others. 
Partisan Cues and Evaluation of Incongruent Information 
From the perspective of political psychology, the way that people process infor-
mation about policy statements in relation to political candidates and groups 
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can be understood in terms of social identity and partisan stereotypes (Green, 
Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002; Greene, 1999; Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; 
Rahn, 1993). Stereotypes, including those related to political groups or iden-
tities, often serve as a cognitive heuristic that simplifies the political decision-
making process by establishing expectations about preferred policy positions 
based on group membership. Political scientists have demonstrated that vot-
ers often use partisan stereotypes and cues as a cognitive heuristic when eval-
uating political candidates and situations (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Mal-
hotra & Kuo, 2008). Party identification cues can be such a strong heuristic 
that when politicians vote or support an issue across party lines, political so-
phisticates behave as though they are misinformed (Dancey & Sheagley, 2013) 
and the general electorate from the respective party may show greater support 
for the issue (Cohen, 2003; Nicholson, 2011). Deviation from reliance on ste-
reotypes is likely to occur only in particular circumstances, such as when is-
sues are salient, or for specific types of voters, such as those with more knowl-
edge or information (Arceneaux, 2008). 
Social psychological research has shown that stereotyping is largely an auto-
matic cognitive process. Counterstereotypical or incongruent information is of-
ten ignored or assimilated to an existing stereotype, but the use of stereotypical 
information is influenced by motivation (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). People can 
and sometimes do think more carefully about stereotype incongruent informa-
tion or attitudinally incongruent information more generally, but only when it 
has motivational significance or if they are predisposed to engage in more care-
ful thinking. Contemporary attitude theory and research suggests that evalua-
tive processing more generally is largely automatic, but influenced by context, 
motivation, and goals (Cunningham et al., 2007; Fazio, 2007). Automatic evalu-
ation involves processing in a number of subcortical regions implicated in emo-
tion and affect, including amygdala and insula, whereas cortical regions such 
as anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, and prefrontal cortex may help to 
signal the need for engaging additional higher-order processing (Cunningham 
et al., 2011; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham et al., 2007). This work 
has established a network of brain regions likely implicated in the evaluation 
of information—regardless of the type of information encountered. Incongru-
ent information, or events that violate expectations, is met with relatively au-
tomatic affective reactions in the amygdala and insula that are translated into 
higher-order processing via the ACC, orbitofrontal cortex, and prefrontal cortex. 
Much of the existing cognitive neuroscience work examining how people 
respond to stereotypically incongruent information has focused on the do-
main of person perception, examining how people respond to individual ex-
emplars who deviate from expectations. These tasks have shown that expec-
tancy violations in person perception are associated with activation in regions 
related to mentalizing, or simulating the minds of others (e.g., medial pre-
frontal cortex and temporoparietal junction) and more generally, regions as-
sociated with conflict detection and cognitive control (anterior cingulate and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, e.g., Cloutier et al., 2011; Hehman, Ingbretsen, 
& Freeman, 2014). It is worth noting here that expectancy violations are not 
the only factor that influences the degree to which people engage in mental-
izing, as other work has shown people are more likely to mentalize in relation 
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to ingroup versus outgroup members (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). This 
suggests that people are likely to attend not only to whether or not informa-
tion is incongruent with expectations, but also other aspects of the situation 
such as the group membership of the evaluative target. 
The aforementioned research can readily be applied to political attitudes. 
Recent work in political neuroscience has begun to examine processes in-
volved in political evaluation, such as political candidate perception and eval-
uation. Much of this work has presented participants with names or faces of 
political candidates and found activation in many of the same brain regions 
involved in evaluative processing more generally. For example, fMRI studies 
have shown activation in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when people are evaluating disliked or op-
position political candidates (Kaplan et al., 2007; Spezio et al., 2008). How-
ever, other fMRI work has shown that some of these regions also respond to 
favored candidates (Tusche, Kahnt, Wisniewski, & Haynes, 2013), suggesting 
that it may be premature to explain these effects purely on the basis of posi-
tive versus negative valence or liked versus disliked candidates. Many of these 
brain regions are believed to serve multiple functions, and there is ongoing 
debate about what the exact nature of function in these regions might be. For 
example, the ACC has been implicated in cognitive control, conflict monitor-
ing, and exploring alternative courses of action (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Carter 
et al., 1998; Kolling, Behrens, Wittmann, & Rushworth, 2016). Insula responds 
to motivationally relevant information or salience and may aid in the process 
of integrating cognitive with emotional information (Gu, Liu, Van Dam, Hof, 
& Fan, 2013; Uddin, 2015), and there is also some evidence that activation in 
these regions—insula and ACC—may be linked (Medford & Critchley, 2010). 
Therefore, a limitation of the existing work in this area is that we do not 
necessarily know what activation to candidate faces or names actually repre-
sents in terms of underlying cognitive processing or decision making, unless 
participants are given a specific task to complete during fMRI where the na-
ture of the decision is understood. In the present work, we focus mainly on 
how people evaluate policy information. We use the context of candidate eval-
uation, but are less interested in how people are evaluating the candidates per 
se, and more focused on how they are evaluating policy information associated 
with those candidates. This allows us to examine the extent to which evalua-
tive processing is impacted by incongruence. While existing work has begun 
to explore the neural basis of political evaluation, we still have much to learn 
about the mechanisms underlying this process and how evaluative processing 
functions in the domain of politics. 
Ideological Differences in Political Evaluation 
Existing work in political psychology has argued that individuals with right-
of-center ideological beliefs have stronger preferences for order and struc-
ture and more difficulty processing ambiguity than those with left-of-center 
ideological beliefs (e.g., Golec & Federico, 2004; Jost et al., 2003, 2007). The 
theory underlying this work is that conservatives seek to impose structure on 
the world in order to manage negative emotions, and indeed, conservatism 
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has been correlated with a variety of survey measures examining this general 
tendency across cultures (Atieh, Brief, & Vollrath, 1987; Chirumbolo, Areni, & 
Sensales, 2004; Fay & Frese, 2000; Gillies & Campbell, 1985; Jost et al., 2003; 
Kemmelmeier, 2007; Leone & Chirumbolo, 2008; Zavala, Golec, Cislak, & We-
solowska, 2010). With regard to brain differences, research has shown con-
servatives to have greater neural sensitivity to negative emotions (Ahn et al., 
2014) and less neural sensitivity to cues for altering habitual response pat-
terns than liberals, suggesting that conservatism is associated with decreased 
conflict monitoring compared to liberalism (Amodio et al., 2007). These find-
ings have been corroborated by evidence that gray matter volume in the brain 
regions associated with conflict monitoring (i.e., ACC) are greater in liberals 
and gray matter volume in the brain regions associated with detecting emo-
tional relevance (i.e., right amygdala) was greater in conservatives (Kanai, 
Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). Taken together, these findings suggest liberals 
are more tolerant of ambiguity, but are also more likely to detect conflict and 
adjust evaluations and behavior accordingly. 
When it comes to evaluating political candidates, we expected ideological 
asymmetries in conflict monitoring to manifest when people responded to can-
didates expressing policy positions incongruent with their party affiliation. 
Given that, as explained earlier, party affiliations act largely as social identi-
ties and party labels cue people to infer policy positions about candidates, we 
expected incongruent policy positions to reflect deviations from what is ex-
pected given party stereotypes. In general, incongruent policy positions should 
trigger enhanced processing of political candidates because they should elicit 
an affective response and activate conflict monitoring systems in the brain. 
However, given the literature on ideological differences in conflict monitor-
ing, we expected the activation of these systems (i.e., insula, ACC) to be par-
ticularly strong for liberals compared to conservatives. Further, work in social 
psychology suggests people attend to and evaluate objects that are personally 
relevant more intensely than objects that are less personally relevant (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986), and because of this enhanced processing, we expected ide-
ological asymmetries in evaluation of incongruent policy positions to be par-
ticularly relevant when evaluating ingroup candidates (i.e., candidates from 
the individuals’ own party). 
Overview of Present Work 
In the present work, we used functional MRI (fMRI) to examine the impact 
of incongruent information on political evaluation. We leveraged instances of 
issue positions conflicting with hypothetical candidates’ party identification 
as an opportunity to study how people responded to incongruent information 
in the political domain, and how responses to incongruent information var-
ied across individuals with different ideological belief systems. This investi-
gation has direct implications for understanding how individuals respond to 
candidates deviating from the party line and thus also holds implications for 
understanding the psychological factors that constrain political elites’ pol-
icy positions in an increasingly polarized government. Further, by examining 
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ideological asymmetries in these processes, this study provides a first step in 
understanding how some political elites may experience varying degrees of 
scrutiny or success for deviating from party norms. However, it is important 
to note that this study is not an investigation of candidate evaluations, person 
perception, or voting decisions, but rather how individuals deal with expec-
tancy violations and incongruence more broadly within the context of politics. 
We focused our inquiry on brain regions previously implicated in both at-
titudes and evaluative processing more generally (Cunningham et al., 2011; 
Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham et al., 2007) and evaluation in the 
political domain (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006)—namely 
the amygdala, insular cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. Based on prior 
work in social and cognitive neuroscience (Botvinick, 2007; Carter et al., 1998; 
Kolling et al., 2016), we expected the insula and ACC to be especially respon-
sive to conflict and incongruence. The insula, specifically, should be involved 
in helping integrate emotional and affective responses with an evaluative de-
cision, especially when individuals are confronted with an expectancy viola-
tion. It is less clear whether we should expect to see differences in the amyg-
dala in a task like this, given that the task is fairly complex and the amygdala 
is thought to be activated mainly during tasks that involve quick, affective or 
emotional responses. However, we nonetheless examined activation in the 
amygdala because some work has suggested the function of the amygdala is to 
automatically evaluate whether objects have motivational relevance, which we 
expect to be the case in this task (e.g., Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, 
& Banaji, 2003; Cunningham, Van Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008). 
We measured political ideology in order to examine whether it moderated 
neural responses to incongruent information for ingroup versus outgroup po-
litical candidates. Based on prior literature on psychological differences be-
tween liberals and conservatives, we expected ideology to moderate neural ac-
tivation in the insula and ACC, and possibly amygdala. Specifically, functional 
activation in left insula has been associated with greater liberalism during 
behavioral decision-making and emotion-related tasks (Ahn et al., 2014; Sch-
reiber et al., 2013). Other work has suggested there may be both structural and 
functional differences related to ideology in ACC, such that liberals are more 
likely to engage in conflict monitoring (which may be reflected in ACC activa-
tion; Amodio et al., 2007) and show larger gray matter volume in ACC (Kanai 
et al., 2011). In addition, existing work has shown that conservatives showed 
more activation in right amygdala during a decision-making task (Schreiber 
et al., 2013). Thus, we expected incongruent policy positions to be associated 
with increased activity in the ACC and insula for liberals and increased activ-
ity in the right amygdala for conservatives. However, the existing literature on 
ideological differences in political neuroscience is still relatively sparse, so we 
were open to alternate possibilities. Finally, based on work in social psychol-
ogy on role of personal relevance in cognitive elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986), we expected these differences to be predominantly relevant for evalu-
ations of statements by ingroup candidates. 
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Method 
Participants 
Fifty-eight healthy adults (34 females and 24 males; age range 19–59, M = 
25.4, SD = 9.2) participated in the experiment. Participants were politically 
diverse, with 32 identifying as liberal and 26 identifying as conservative. Par-
ticipants were recruited from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and the sur-
rounding community. All participants were right-handed, had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision, and no known history of neurological disorders. 
Participants were safety screened to ensure eligibility for MRI and provided 
informed consent in accord with study approval by the institutional review 
board. They were compensated $30 USD for their participation. 
Experimental Design and Stimuli 
Participants came to the MRI center and participated in a rapid event-related 
fMRI experiment where they evaluated the policy positions of hypothetical po-
litical candidates during MRI. Prior to the scan, participants were informed 
about the order of MRI scans and received an overview of the experimental 
task. Participants were instructed that they would be evaluating issue posi-
tions attributed to hypothetical political candidates, but we asked them to 
think about these candidates as if they were real candidates running for of-
fice. They knew they would see a series of policy statements that each can-
didate either supported or opposed and that they should tell us whether that 
issue position made them feel good or bad. We did not define these terms for 
participants, but told them that responses were subjective and we wanted to 
know what they thought. They were encouraged to focus on the issue positions 
and not explicitly instructed to form an impression of the candidate. There 
was no expectation that they needed to remember each candidate after the 
block of trials ended (i.e., participants knew they would not be asked follow-
up questions about the candidates themselves). They were encouraged to bal-
ance speed with accuracy in responding, but to rely on their initial response 
given the limited response window. 
The experiment had a 2 trial type (congruent/incongruent) × 2 block type 
(ingroup/outgroup) within-subjects design.1 The experimental paradigm was 
designed to manipulate incongruence as a function of the candidates’ issue po-
sitions and political party affiliation. Experimental stimuli were presented in 
the scanner using E-Prime 2.0.10 (Psychology Software Tools, 2012). Prior to 
the start of each block, participants received information about the political 
candidate (Democrat or Republican) that they would be evaluating for that set 
of trials. All participants evaluated policy positions attributed to four different 
candidates (two Democrats and two Republicans) in a randomized order, and 
1. We also varied task uncertainty but that is beyond the scope of the present manu-
script and will not be discussed here. 
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all hypothetical candidates were White males.2 Both trial order and interstim-
ulus interval (ISI) duration were predetermined using Optseq2 [https://surfer.
nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq], a software package designed to help maximize 
efficiency and ability to accurately model the hemodynamic response in rapid 
event-related designs (see Burock, Buckner, Woldorff, Rosen, & Dale, 1998; 
Dale, Greve, & Burock, 1999). 
On each trial, participants received information about a specific policy po-
sition attributed to the candidate and information about whether the candidate 
supported or opposed that issue. Next, a policy statement appeared, and par-
ticipants were asked to evaluate how they (subjectively) felt about the candi-
date’s position on that issue by selecting either good or bad using the response 
pad while in the scanner (1 = good, 2 = bad). Each trial (see Fig. 1, for exam-
ple) consisted of presentation of a cue (750 ms) followed by a policy statement 
(4250 ms) and a fixation cross that was on screen for each jittered interstim-
ulus interval (ISI: 2500, 5000, 7500, 10,000, or 12,500 ms). A majority of the 
issue positions (66.6%) in each block were congruent with the candidate’s po-
litical identification (as determined by behavioral pilot data), but a smaller 
subset were incongruent with his identification (33.3%) to allow for exami-
nation of both congruent and incongruent issue positions. While this means 
participants saw fewer incongruent trials relative to congruent trials, this was 
done to increase external validity of the task, as most mainstream political 
candidates tend to hold fairly consistent issue positions (e.g., Jennings, 1992). 
After the MRI portion of the study, participants completed a post-scan sur-
vey where they provided additional ratings of the 96 policy statements they 
saw while in the scanner. Participants rated how important each issue was 
to them personally on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all important to 
7 = extremely important and rated their own support or opposition to each 
statement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = support completely to 7 = op-
pose completely.3 The order of these blocks was counterbalanced so that some 
participants evaluated support first and others started with importance. Par-
ticipants then responded to a series of demographic questions, including a 
one-item measure of political ideology asking them to place themselves on a 
continuum from 1 = very liberal to 6 = very conservative.4 The mean response 
on the political ideology item was near the midpoint of the scale (M = 3.34, 
SD = 1.40). This item was mean-centered for analysis. 
2. The candidates themselves were not the primary focus of this experiment, so this 
choice was made to minimize potential variability in candidate evaluation as a func-
tion of gender or race. Six candidate images were chosen from the Chicago Face Data-
base (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015), based on gender, race, and perceived age. Four 
images were randomly selected for each participant and shown in randomized order. 
3. Participants also completed a number of individual difference measures after scan-
ning, but these are beyond the scope of the current manuscript and will not be dis-
cussed in more detail here. 
4. No option for “moderate” was offered in order to ensure we could discriminate be-
tween candidates that would be most likely seen as “ingroup” and “outgroup” candi-
dates. Further, partisan “leaners” and even Independents have been shown to largely 
manifest the same-party-based evaluations as partisan identifiers and tend to show 
meaningful implicit preferences (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; 
Keith et al., 1986; Lundberg & Payne, 2014). 
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Policy Statements. We generated a long list of relevant policy statements 
including social, economic, and foreign policy issues. Policy statements were 
pilot tested using a separate sample obtained through Amazon’s Mechani-
cal Turk (N = 255). Participants in the pilot study rated their support or op-
position to each of the issues, how important each issue was to them, and 
whether each issue was likely to be supported more by Democrats or Repub-
licans (all on 7-point scales). Policy statements for this experiment were se-
lected from pilot data based on the degree to which they were clearly Dem-
ocratic or Republican issues and equated as much as possible for degree of 
support or opposition and issue importance. Statements were separated into 
four lists to be used for randomization in E-Prime (two lists of Democratic 
positions, two Republican). Participants saw each statement twice over the 
course of the experiment, but issues were not seen twice for a single candi-
date (see Appendix for full list of stimuli). 
MRI Data Acquisition 
MRI data were acquired using a Siemens Skyra 3.0 Tesla MRI with a 32-chan-
nel head coil. Prior to functional imaging, a high-resolution T1-weighted 3D 
anatomical image (MPRAGE; field of view (FoV) read = 256 mm, slice thickness 
= 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm, repetition time (TR) = 2400 ms, echo time (TE) = 3.37 
ms, inversion time (TI) = 991 ms, prescan normalize on, PAT mode GRAPPA) 
was collected for spatial normalization. Functional MRI data were acquired 
with acquisition parallel to the AC-PC line to maximize whole-brain cover-
age (42 slices, FoV read = 220 mm, slice thickness = 3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0 mm, TR 
= 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 80°, prescan normalize off). Participants 
completed four blocks of functional scanning, lasting approximately 8.5 min 
each. The first five volumes of each run were discarded to avoid variability 
due to pre-steady-state functional data. 
Fig. 1. Example trial from experimental task participants completed during MRI. 
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MRI Data Preprocessing and Analysis 
MRI data were preprocessed using fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) in FM-
RIB Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 
2012; Smith et al., 2004) on MacOS. The high-resolution 3D anatomical im-
age (MPRAGE) was skull stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction Function (BET; 
Smith, 2002). Data from functional runs were subjected to normalization, reg-
istration to both MPRAGE and standard space (MNI152), spatial smoothing at 
FWHM of 5 mm, slice timing correction (to correct for interleaved data acqui-
sition), and motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, 
& Smith, 2002). 
Analyses were conducted using the general linear model (GLM) as imple-
mented in FSL. Time-series data were modeled at the first level (the trial level) 
using FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model (FILM), and then, higher-level analy-
sis (across sessions first, and then across subjects) was carried out using FM-
RIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME; see Smith et al., 2004). First, 
the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal was modeled at the trial level 
for each run as a function of trial type (congruent/incongruent). Data from 
each run were then averaged across subjects using a fixed effects model. At 
the subject level, we also modeled the effect of block type—whether the polit-
ical candidate in each block shared the participant’s ideological identification 
(ingroup candidate) or not (outgroup candidate). This allowed us to examine 
whether incongruence effects differ as a function of the target of evaluation 
(ingroup vs. outgroup candidate), in addition to the effects of policy informa-
tion. The subject-level analyses were then combined into group-level region 
of interest (ROI) analyses using FSL FLAME1. ROI analyses on left amygdala, 
right amygdala, bilateral insula, and anterior cingulate cortex were masked 
prior to analysis (using anatomical masks from the Harvard–Oxford Corti-
cal/Subcortical Atlases provided with FSL) and cluster corrected to correct 
for multiple comparisons. In FSL, a Z-statistic>2.0 was used to define con-
tiguous clusters, and then, cluster probabilities were compared to the (cor-
rected) cluster significance threshold of p < .05 using Gaussian random field 
theory (Worsley, 2001). 
In order to plot the BOLD activation related to political ideology, cluster 
masks were created using fslmaths for each significant cluster of activation, 
and mean activation to trial type as a function of block type (i.e., incongruent 
outgroup, incongruent ingroup, congruent outgroup, congruent ingroup) was 
extracted using these cluster masks in FEATQuery. 
Results 
Behavioral Task Data 
First, we examined the data from the behavioral task participants completed 
while in the scanner. A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to examine re-
sponse latency as a function of trial type (congruent/incongruent), evaluative 
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response (good/bad), and block type (ingroup/outgroup candidate). Overall, 
participants were significantly faster to respond on congruent (M = 2553 ms, 
SD = 741 ms) versus incongruent trials (M = 2631 ms, SD = 726 ms; F(1,51) = 
33.14, p < .001). Responses were also significantly faster when participants 
selected the good (M = 2546 ms, SD = 742) versus bad (M = 2613 ms, SD = 730 
ms) response option (F(1,52) = 11.96, p = .001); however, it is worth noting 
here that participants always selected the good option with their index finger. 
There was no overall main effect of response latency for block type (ingroup/
outgroup candidate). Looking at interaction effects among trial type (congru-
ent/incongruent), response (good/bad), and block type (ingroup/outgroup) 
revealed a significant interaction of response with block type (F(1,56) = 9.19, 
p = .004) and a significant three-way interaction with trial type (F(1,57) = 
22.09, p < .001). Overall, participants were faster to respond good (M = 2437, 
SD = 754) than bad (M = 2712, SD = 695) on congruent ingroup trials and on 
incongruent outgroup trials (good: M = 2570, SD = 727; bad: M = 2683, SD = 
768). Participants were faster to respond bad than good for both incongru-
ent ingroup trials (bad: M = 2609, SD = 707; good: M = 2715, SD = 700) and 
congruent outgroup trials (bad: M = 2535, SD = 740; good: M = 2626, SD = 
727), although these differences were smaller. These results show that as ex-
pected, individuals were faster to respond good when their ingroup stated a 
position consistent with their party affiliation or when the outgroup stated a 
position incongruent with their party affiliation, and vice versa with regard 
to responding bad. 
Next, we ran a similar repeated-measures ANOVA model adding mean-cen-
tered political ideology as a between-subjects factor, with trial type, evaluative 
response, and block type all modeled as within-subjects factors. This model 
again showed a significant three-way interaction of trial type, response, and 
block type, but this was qualified by a four-way interaction including political 
ideology (F(1,55) = 12.03, p = .001). This interaction suggests that political ide-
ology moderated the effects of trial type, response, and block type on response 
latency. In order to interpret this interaction effect, we dichotomized the ide-
ology variable (1–3 = liberal, 4–6 = conservative) and re-ran the model de-
scribed in the above paragraph separately for both liberals and conservatives. 
For liberal participants, there were significant main effects of trial type 
(F(1,25) = 29.04, p < .001) and evaluative response (F(1,27) = 8.55, p = .007) 
on response latency. Liberals also showed a significant interaction of block 
type with response (F(1,30) = 12.86, p = .001) and a significant three-way in-
teraction with trial type (F(1,31) = 34.27, p < .001). All other effects for lib-
erals were not statistically significant. For conservative participants, there 
were significant main effects of trial type (F(1,22) = 6.47, p = .020) and re-
sponse (F(1,20) = 5.28, p = .033). None of the interaction effects were statis-
tically significant for conservatives. Figure 2 shows mean response latency 
as a function of political ideology. Overall, the biggest difference is that re-
sponse latency for liberal participants varied more as a function of trial type 
than it did for conservative participants. Liberal participants, for example, 
were quicker to respond good (M = 2398, SD = 767) versus bad (M = 2841, SD 
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= 711) on congruent ingroup trials. Conservative participants show the same 
pattern (good: M = 2509, SD = 728; bad: M = 2637, SD = 678) for congruent 
ingroup trials, but not to the same degree. Overall, response latency for liber-
als varied more as a function of trial type, response, and block type. In other 
words, conservatives were less likely to exhibit qualifications in the timing 
of their responses based on congruence and party affiliation of the candidate. 
Finally, we examined descriptive data for the number of trials on which 
participants responded good versus bad as a function of trial type, block type, 
and political ideology (see Fig. 3). Consistent with the variation in response la-
tency, we can see that liberals appeared to be modifying their responses more 
in relation to trial type and block type. For example, they were more likely 
to judge consistent ingroup trials as good versus bad, whereas conservatives 
showed more of a 50–50 split. 
fMRI Data 
Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal was modeled as a function of 
trial type (congruent/incongruent) and block type (ingroup/outgroup candi-
date). ROI analyses revealed significant clusters of activation in anterior cin-
gulate, insula, and amygdala that will be detailed below (see Table 1 for full 
list of significant clusters). 
Fig. 2. Response latency (milliseconds) as a function of trial type (congruent/incongru-
ent), evaluative response (good/bad), block type (ingroup/outgroup), and political ide-
ology (1 = liberal, 6 = conservative). 
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Main Effect of Incongruent > Congruent Trials 
First, we examined the main effect of incongruence by examining directional 
contrasts designed to compare differences in BOLD activation between in-
congruent and congruent trials. Region of interest analyses revealed signif-
icant clusters of activation in anterior cingulate, insula, and amygdala for 
incongruent>congruent trials (see Fig. 4). Consistent with the view that ACC is 
involved in processing incongruent information, we saw a large cluster of acti-
vation in dorsal ACC and paracingulate in response to incongruent>congruent 
trials (see Fig. 4a; 2354 voxels, Z-max = 4.51, p < .001; MNI Coordinates: X = 
–4, Y =  –14, Z = 50). The same contrast (incongruent>congruent) also showed 
bilateral activation in insula and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; see Fig. 4b), 
with a larger cluster of voxels on the right (441 voxels, Z-max = 3.84, p = .005; 
MNI coordinates: X = 32, Y = 28, Z =  –2) than the left (252 voxels, Z-max = 
3.33, p = .042; MNI coordinates: X =  –26, Y = 22, Z =  –8). Finally, there was 
a significant cluster in right amygdala active for the incongruent>congruent 
contrast (see Fig. 4c; 213 voxels, Z-max = 3.47, p = .018; MNI coordinates: X = 
32, Y =  –2, Z =  –28). No significant activation was observed in left amygdala. 
We also examined the reverse contrast to see whether any of these ROIs 
showed greater activation to congruent versus incongruent trials. No signifi-
cant clusters of activation were shown. We modeled whether neural process-
ing of incongruence differed when participants were evaluating ingroup ver-
sus outgroup candidates and again, there were no overall main effects of block 
type emerged in these ROIs. 
Fig. 3. Evaluative response (good/bad) as a function of trial type (congruent/incongru-
ent), block type (ingroup/outgroup), and political ideology (1 = liberal, 6 = conservative). 
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Moderation by Political Ideology 
Next, we added self-reported political ideology (mean centered) to the group-
level analysis in FSL as a continuous covariate to examine whether ideology 
moderated responses to incongruent versus congruent trials, and whether 
that response differed for ingroup versus outgroup candidates. Ideology did 
not have a significant influence on overall responses to incongruent versus 
congruent trials, but we did observe significant clusters in ACC and insula for 
the ingroup>outgroup contrast, suggesting that ideology had an impact on the 
degree to which these ROIs were responding to incongruent versus congruent 
issue positions from ingroup versus outgroup candidates (see Fig. 5). We did 
Fig. 4. BOLD activation in ACC, 
bilateral insula, and right amygdala 
in response to incongruent>congruent 
trials. Images were created by 
overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic 
image on a standard space template 
(MNI152). Images are centered on the 
peak voxel for each cluster from the 
ROI analyses in: a. anterior cingulate, 
b. insula, c. right amygdala. 
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not find any significant clusters of activation in relation to political ideology 
in left or right amygdala. 
There was a significant cluster of activation for the interaction of trial type 
(incongruent>congruent), block type (ingroup>outgroup), and political ideol-
ogy (liberal>conservative) in the ACC (see Fig. 5a; 1413 voxels, Z-max = 3.76, 
p < .001; MNI coordinates: X = 10, Y = 46, Z = 12). As shown in the scatterplot 
in Fig. 5a, ACC activation to incongruence from ingroup versus outgroup can-
didates showed a negative relationship with political ideology. In other words, 
more liberal participants showed greater activation in ACC to incongruent 
versus congruent trials for ingroup (Democratic) candidates, whereas more 
conservative participants showed greater ACC activation to incongruent ver-
sus congruent trials for outgroup (Democratic) candidates. This is consistent 
with the behavioral data described above, where we observed liberal partici-
pants showed greater variability in both response latency and evaluative re-
sponse for ingroup candidates—consistent with the view that they were more 
responsive to incongruence on those trials and perhaps more likely to engage 
in cognitive elaboration for incongruent trials, slowing their response time. 
The same pattern emerged in a region of left insula (see Fig. 5b; 428 vox-
els, Z-max = 3.49, p = .009; MNI coordinates: X =  –44, Y = 22, Z =  –6). More 
liberal participants showed greater activation in left insula in response to 
incongruent versus congruent trials for ingroup candidates, whereas more 
Fig. 5. BOLD activation in response to the interaction of trial type (incongruent> 
 congruent), block type (ingroup>outgroup), and political ideology (liberal>conservative) 
in a. anterior cingulate cortex and b. left insula. Images were created by overlaying the 
thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space template (MNI152). Plots represent 
mean parameter estimates by condition extracted from functional clusters. 
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conservative participants showed greater activation in left insula in response 
to incongruent versus congruent trials for outgroup candidates. 
Discussion 
In sum, this experiment provides some initial evidence that neural processing 
of political issue positions differs as a function of both incongruence and group 
status, and these effects vary across political ideology. We observed neural ac-
tivation in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and amygdala in relation 
to incongruent versus congruent trials. Activation in both ACC and insula was 
moderated by group status (whether participants were evaluating an ingroup 
versus outgroup political candidate) and participants’ political ideology. Lib-
eral participants were more likely to show greater activation in ACC and in-
sula in response to incongruent versus congruent trials, namely when political 
candidates were ingroup members. Liberal participants were also more likely 
than conservative participants to base their evaluative decisions on whether 
or not information was incongruent, and showed more evidence for differ-
entiation in terms of response latency. Relative to more conservative partic-
ipants, liberal participants were more likely to rate congruent ingroup trials 
as good (vs. bad) and incongruent ingroup trials as bad (vs. good), and they 
were slower to respond when deviating from this response pattern. 
There is an extant literature in political science on how individuals pro-
cess political information and political candidates, yet an understanding of the 
psychological mechanisms by which people make political evaluations is far 
from complete, and an understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying 
political evaluations is in its infancy. The primary implication of the findings 
presented here is that people may be more likely to attend to incongruent is-
sue positions for same-party candidates, but that liberals are more likely to do 
this relative to conservatives. This is consistent with prior literature arguing 
that liberals are more likely to detect and process conflict relative to conser-
vatives (Amodio et al., 2007), as well as prior fMRI work that has shown dif-
ferences in neural processing between liberals and conservatives in these re-
gions during emotion-related or decision-making tasks (e.g., Ahn et al., 2014; 
Schreiber et al., 2013). It is also consistent with prior work showing that peo-
ple tend to engage in additional processing in regions such as medial prefron-
tal cortex for incongruent social targets (Cloutier et al., 2011; Hehman et al., 
2014), but shows that this can be extended to regions involved in evaluative 
processing and conflict detection more generally (i.e., insula, ACC) and that 
processing is influenced by both political ideology and by group membership 
in the political domain. 
One limitation of the present work is that we relied on hypothetical po-
litical candidates to present information to participants. While this allowed 
for greater experimental control, it may limit the extent to which the results 
generalize to evaluation of real-life political figures, given that real life is of-
ten much more complicated. There were no personally meaningful outcomes 
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associated with the task participants completed in this study, so it is possible 
that our liberal participants were more motivated to engage processing in-
congruence in the task, but perhaps conservative participants would be more 
likely to do so under other conditions. Future work might explore the mod-
erating (or mediating) role of other variables that may impact the degree to 
which people engage in cognitive elaboration about incongruent political in-
formation, such as political knowledge or the Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
The implications of these findings for democratic representation are sub-
stantial. Government has become increasingly polarized for a number of rea-
sons, including institutional design pressures and pressures for parties to “toe 
the party line” (i.e., constrain their policy positions to those that fit strictly 
within the party platform) in order to gain support among their base (Dal-
ton, 2008; Masket, 2009; Sinclair, 2006; Theriault, 2008). Citizens have of-
ten lamented such polarization as alienating broad swaths of the more politi-
cally moderate electorate, but as this study suggests, how individuals process 
elites’ congruent versus incongruent policy positions may also provide a con-
straint on the ability of politicians to stray from the party line. The results of 
this study suggest that when individuals evaluate the policy positions of their 
party’s candidates, deviations from party stereotypes are likely to receive ad-
ditional processing and be labeled as “bad” compared to policy positions that 
fit party stereotypes. These findings may be concerning to those who see po-
litical polarization as a problem as well as to those who desire meaningful 
social change, as they demonstrate the psychological processes that help to 
hinder the likelihood of political compromise, which is necessary for trans-
lating desired policy into implemented policy given the divided nature of gov-
ernment in the USA. 
Further, the observed ideological asymmetries in evaluative processing of 
incongruent policy positions suggest the electorate may be more likely to scru-
tinize incongruence coming from Democratic candidates and politicians com-
pared to Republicans. Activation in ACC and insula does not, however, neces-
sarily indicate punishment of incongruent policy positions among Democrats. 
For example, it is possible that activity in these brain regions would also be 
observed for attempts to reconcile incongruence with party loyalties or engage 
in motivated reasoning. However, the behavioral results regarding evaluative 
decisions and response latency suggest liberals are more likely to see incon-
gruence among Democrats as negative. This does not mean there are not sit-
uations under which Republican elites are scrutinized for holding incongru-
ent issue positions, but this may be the exception rather than the rule. The 
ideological asymmetries in our results have some interesting implications. In 
terms of resistance to compromise, it may be Democrats rather than Republi-
cans who face the greatest scrutiny by constituents for deviating from party-
based expectations. If less scrutiny is applied to Republicans for policy de-
viations, it may indicate that specific liberal causes and policies have some 
electoral viability among Republican candidates. In other words, Republican 
candidates and representatives may be allowed to adopt liberal stances on 
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some subset of issues without facing scrutiny from their Republican constit-
uents. This is speculative, however, and may be dependent on the extent to 
which these policy deviations are highlighted for voters by third parties such 
as the media or interest groups. 
This implication may seem odd given other empirical findings that sug-
gest, for example, that political conservatives are less open-minded (Mondak, 
2010) and less tolerant of ambiguity (Jost et al., 2003, 2007) relative to liber-
als, and that elite polarization over the past few decades has been driven pre-
dominantly by shifts among Republican elites toward increasingly conservative 
policy positions (McCarty et al., 2006). There could be multiple explanations 
for this apparent discrepancy. For example, it may be the case that whereas 
liberals respond more to ideological inconsistency within Democratic candi-
dates and representatives, conservatives respond more simply to group dy-
namics such as party affiliation and loyalty (i.e., whether the candidate or rep-
resentative is viewed as a dedicated member of their ingroup). Alternatively, 
some work points to increasing fractionalization among Republican elites and 
members of the public—that is, the development of distinct clusters and coali-
tions within the Republican Party, each with particular sets of issues on which 
they are extreme (see Hare & Poole, 2014). Contemporary political disagree-
ment among Republican elites regarding health insurance, social issues, and 
foreign policy supports this proposition. If this is true, it could suggest that 
the Republican platform is significantly fractured to the degree that conser-
vative members of the public have a difficult time identifying policy positions 
that are incongruent. In other words, the ideological differences we observed 
here could be context-dependent. Future research should continue to exam-
ine ideological asymmetries in responses to incongruent policy positions and 
the extent to which these differences may shift over time. 
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Banning the death penalty 
Requiring guns be locked in a safe 
Government insurance covering all medical costs 
Legalization of medical marijuana 
Teaching evolution 
A path to US citizenship for illegal immigrants 
Legalizing same-sex marriage 
Sex education in schools 
Requiring body cameras on police officers 
Harsher punishment for police use of excessive force 
Allowing cyclists to use public streets 
Same-sex civil unions 
Waiting periods for gun purchase 
Government regulation of business 
Mandatory recycling 
Expanding Medicaid 
Federal government action to reduce unemployment 
Automatic citizenship for immigrants 
Restricting the death penalty 
A ban on semiautomatic weapons 
Maintaining the legal right to abortion 
Raising the federal minimum wage 
Federal government action on global warming 
Diplomatic solution with ISIS in Iraq 
Government benefits for low-income families 
Economic incentives for businesses reducing pollution 
Requiring background checks to buy guns 
Requiring United Nations approval for US military action 
USA aid to Africa to help fight Ebola 
Increased racial diversity in police departments 
Decreasing defense spending 
Granting amnesty to some immigrants 
Lighter prison sentences for victimless crimes 
A ban on religious symbols in schools 
The right to have an abortion 
Physician-assisted suicide 
Legalizing marijuana   (continued)
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Universal health care 
Limitations on gun ownership 
Government regulation of pollution 
Allowing gay people to adopt 
Legalizing prostitution 
Higher taxes for the top 1% 
Withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan 
Government funding for stem-cell research 
A ban on school prayer 
Euthanasia for terminally ill patients 
Decreasing the size of the army 
Republican Statements 
Sending troops to fight ISIS 
Invading Iran 
A ban on travel from West Africa to prevent spreading Ebola 
Punishing women who drink or use drugs during pregnancy 
The war on drugs 
Fracking (injecting liquid into rocks to extract oil and gas) 
The use of military attack drones 
Decreasing government services 
The death penalty 
Capital punishment 
The right of citizens to own guns 
Allowing illegal immigrants to work only low paying jobs 
Mandatory military service in the USA 
Outlawing abortion 
Eliminating Medicare 
Allowing abortion only in cases of rape or incest 
Allowing high school students to have guns 
A ban on gay couples from adopting children 
Requiring parental consent for teen abortions 
Racial profiling under some circumstances 
Loosening restrictions on gun ownership 
Sending illegal immigrants to work camps 
Privatization of health insurance 
Racial profiling of African Americans 
School prayer 
A ban on sex and violence from television 
Protecting all gun ownership 
Posting the 10 Commandments in every classroom 
Privatization of social security  (continued)
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Decreased regulation of business 
Government access to private email to fight terrorism 
Deportation of unaccompanied minors 
Laws requiring voter identification 
Restrictions on immigration 
A ban on affirmative action 
A ban on same-sex marriage 
Time limits on welfare benefits 
Killing anyone who joins ISIS 
Intervening in the Israel–Palestine conflict 
Dismantling the welfare program 
Deportation of all illegal immigrants 
Expanding the use of the death penalty 
Increasing defense spending 
A ban on environmental regulations 
Establishing English as the official language 
Legalizing carrying concealed weapons 
Suspending civil liberties to fight terrorism 
Abstinence-only sex education 
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